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Abstract
In their 1999 paper, psychologists David Dunning and Justin Kruger
showed that, in general, experts not only provide better estimates of different situations, but they also provide a better estimates of the accuracy
of their estimates. Which this phenomenon has been confirmed by many
follow-up experiments, it remains largely unexplained. In this paper, we
provide a simple system-based qualitative explanation for the DunningKruger effect.

1

Formulation of the Problem

Dunning-Kruger effect: a brief reminder. In their 1999 paper [4], Justin
Kruger and David Dunning from Cornell University showed that:
• not only experts have a better knowledge and produce more accurate
estimates than novices,
• experts also assess their own accuracy with better accuracy than novices;
see also [2, 8]. This phenomenon became known as the Dunning-Kruger effect.
Comment. It should be mentioned that in their original paper [4], due to faulty
statistical analysis, the above claim was more specific:
• that experts usually underestimate their abilities (in particular, overestimate the inaccuracy of their estimates),
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• while novices usually overestimate their ability (in particular, underestimate the inaccuracy of their estimates).
A more accurate statistical analysis has shown that this specific claim is not
supported by the evidence. However, the above claim – that experts estimate the
accuracy of their own estimates better than novices – is definitely statistically
valid; see, e.g., [5, 6].
Challenge. The effect is there, but how can we explain it?
What we do in this paper. In this paper, we provide a simple system-based
qualitative explanation for the Dunning-Kruger effect.
Remaining open question and future work. We hope that future research
will help transform our qualitative explanation into a more quantitative one.

2

Our Explanation

Towards formulating the problem in precise terms. What we want from
experts is an estimate of the state of the corresponding system:
• this system is a patient if this expert is a medical doctor,
• this system is a complex machine if the expert is an engineer,
• this system is a mineral deposit if the expert is a geophysicist, etc.
Most information is usually described in terms of real numbers. In this
sense, what we want from an expert is to provide some estimates of the numbers
describing the corresponding system.
For example, based on his/her expertise (and on other available information),
a geophysicist can provide us with:
• an estimate of the amount of oil in a given oil field,
• an estimate of the depth at which this oil will most probably be found,
etc.
In all these cases, we want to predict the value of the desired quantity y
based on the available values x1 , . . . , xn of related quantities. In other words,
we need to have some prediction algorithm
y = f (x1 , . . . , xn ).
Depending on the previously available data, we can have different prediction
algorithms. For example, if we want to predict tomorrow’s weather, then:
• in some areas (e.g., areas shielded by mountain ranges), it is sufficient to
take into account today’s weather patterns only in the nearby areas, while
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• in other places (e.g., on the plains where cyclones and other weather phenomena can travel large distances fast), we need to take into account
today’s weather in a much wider area.
In general, instead of a single algorithm
y = f (x1 , . . . , xn ),
we have a family of algorithms
y = f (x1 , . . . , xn , c1 , . . . , cm )
depending on some parameters c1 , . . . , cm . These parameters c1 , . . . , cm need to
be determined based on the available data.
• In statistics [7] and in machine learning (see, e.g., [1, 3]) the corresponding
family of algorithms is usually given explicitly.
• In expert decision making, a lot of the reasoning is happening at the
subconscious level. So we do not have explicit expressions for the corresponding prediction algorithm – but, in effect, experts make predictions –
and thus, subconsciously use some algorithms to make these predictions.
Resulting formulation of the problem. We have a model
y = f (x1 , . . . , xn , c1 , . . . , cm )
that describes the dependence of the desired quantity y on observable quantities x1 , . . . , xn . To make a prediction, we need to estimate the values of the
parameters c1 , . . . , cm that best describe the current situation.
In reality, measurements are approximate, and models are approximate. So,
in the actual dependence of y on x1 , . . . , xn , we do not have the exact equality,
there is also some noise N :
y = f (x1 , . . . , xn , c1 , . . . , cm ) + N.
To estimate the values of these parameters, we can use the results of previous observations. Let K denote the number of such observations. For each
(k)
(k)
observation k = 1, . . . , K, we know the values x1 , . . . , xn and y (k) of the corresponding quantities. We want to find the values of the parameters c1 , . . . , cm
for which


(k)
y (k) ≈ f x1 , . . . , x(k)
n , c1 , . . . , cm
for all k.
Comment. This problem is ubiquitous in applications of statistics, it is known
as regression.
• The most widely used and the most well-known is the linear regression,
when the dependence f (x1 , . . .) on x1 , . . . , xn is linear.
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• However, nonlinear regression is also actively used; see, e.g., [7].
How the estimate’s accuracy depends on the number of observations.
The main difference between an expert and a novice is that an expert is aware
of a much larger number of previous observations: the value K corresponding
to the expert is much larger than the number of observations corresponding to
the novice. Thus, to understand the difference between estimates by experts
and estimates by novices, we need to analyze how the accuracy of an estimation
depends on the available number of observations K.
According to statistics, if we have K observations with standard deviation
σ, then, in general, the accuracy with which we can estimate the values of the
σ
corresponding parameters is proportional to √ ; see, e.g., [7].
K
This formula is easy to derive in the simplest situation, when we simply observe the desired quantity y several times, i.e., if we have K results y (1) , . . . , y (K)
of measuring this same quantity. In this case, a reasonable way to combine these
results into a single more accurate estimate is to take the average
y=

y (1) + . . . + y (K)
.
K

(1)
def

The inaccuracy of each measurement is described by the difference ∆y (k) =
y (k) − y between the measurement result y (k) and the actual (unknown) value
y of the corresponding quantity. From the formula (1), we conclude that the
def

inaccuracy ∆y = y − y of the arithmetic average is equal to
∆y =

∆y (1) + . . . + ∆y (K)
.
K

Inaccuracies ∆y (k) corresponding to different measurements are usually independent. For independent random variables, the variance of the sum is equal to
the sum of the variances. Since each of the inaccuracies ∆y (k) has the variance
σ 2 , the variance of the sum
∆y (1) + . . . + ∆y (K)
is thus equal to K · σ 2 . Hence, the standard
deviation of the sum is equal to
√
the square root of this variance, i.e., to K · σ.
When we divide a random variable by a positive constant, its standard deviation divides by the same constant. Thus, the standard deviation of the
inaccuracy ∆y – corresponding to the use of K observations – is equal to
√
σ
K ·σ
=√ .
K
K
This derivation is only valid for the simplest case, but a similar asymptotics
σ
√ holds in the general situation as well [7]. This confirms the intuitive idea
K
4

that the more experience the expert, the more accurate are this expert’s estimates.
Towards understanding the Dunning-Kruger effect: how accurately
can we estimate the accuracy of our own estimates? Accuracy estimates
presented in the previous subsection depend on the standard deviation σ of the
measurement error – i.e., on the standard deviation of the differences ∆y (k) .
Usually, we do not know this value exactly, but we can estimate it based on the
results of previous observations.
For example, if we simply observe the desired quantity y several times, i.e.,
if we have K results y (1) , . . . , y (K) of measuring this same quantity, then we can
estimate this standard deviation σ as
v
u
K
u 1
X
2
·
y (k) − y .
σ≈σ=t
K −1
k=1

Similar formulas can be used in the general case: once we have estimates
c1 , . . . , cm for the parameters c1 , . . . , cm , we can then estimate σ as
v
u
K 

2
u 1
X
(k)
(k)
·
y (k) − f x1 , . . . , xn , c1 , . . . , cm
σ ≈ σt
.
K −1
k=1

σ−σ
It is known that the relative accuracy
of this estimate decreases with
σ
1
K as √ – at the same rate as the accuracy itself. Thus, the more experienced
K
the expert – i.e., the larger the corresponding K – the more accurately this
expert can estimate the accuracy of his/her estimates.
This is exactly what the Dunning-Kruger effect is about. Thus, we have
indeed found a simple explanation for this effect.
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